THIS is an obituary for the National Counter Terrorism Authority, once conceived as a civilian counterterrorism body that combined policymaking, coordination among law-enforcement agencies, and data collection and processing.
Since its inception in December 2008, and even after gaining legal cover under the Nacta Act, 2013, it has struggled to fully realise its role and mandate, while facing resistance from LEAs reluctant to coordinate with a police-led body.
Appointing a senior military officer as its national coordinator was not the first deviation from the Nacta Act. A bigger departure from the statute had come in 2025 with the establishment of the National Intelligence Fusion and Threat Assessment Centre. Niftac was created as a parallel body, apparently under Nacta but in effect superior to it, even though Nacta is the statutory body. This gave a superior security institution the leading role.
Nacta’s new form seems to have little to do with developing a counterterrorism strategy, building a coordination mechanism, or taking on a CT-related operational role. Its real purpose is to synchronise all civilian-led LEAs with the superior security institution, and, at the very least, to bring them under one roof. This synchronisation of internal security policy with the security doctrine conceived by the establishment’s top brass has been underway for a long time, taking various forms. Bureaucrats see it in the National Security and War Course (NSWC) at the National Defence University (NDU), which is now equivalent to the National Management Course, a mandatory course for promotion from Grade 20 to 21.
The NSWC gives senior bureaucrats more opportunities to align with evolving thinking at the top levels of the security institutions. At the narrative level, NDU and many other military-led institutions run short courses for opinion-makers, politicians, and business and community leaders to align them with the new thought process. Interestingly, all these courses and discourses happen at the expense of civilian governments, whether provincial or federal.
Nacta, the only civilian-led CT body, struggled to find its role and eventually lost.
One may argue that synchronisation within the internal security structure will improve coordination, the very dream for which Nacta was conceived. However, the new changes appear to be aimed at control, and the CT body is being used as an instrument of that. The structures of other LEAs, such as the police and FIA, leave little room for intervention by other institutions — unlike Nacta.
Admittedly, Nacta had a few good leaders who clearly understood the terrorism challenge facing the country and how to respond. But it is safe to say that most of its heads, and even others who served in the authority, had little idea of the CT body’s objectives. Many came on deputation, or to rest before landing a field posting.
As mentioned earlier, Nacta faced pressure and challenges from superior security institutions, which were reluctant to work under or with a civilian-led body. Still, the police cadre is undoubtedly responsible for destroying the institution and providing an excuse for its takeover. This did not happen overnight. The process began much earlier. When former prime minister Imran Khan chaired the Nacta board of governors meeting in September 2018, as required by law, two key realities emerged. One, he was the first prime minister to convene a board meeting since the Act was passed, even though quarterly meetings were required. Two, the national coordinator at the time recommended that the prime minister dissolve the body, as it had no use or role in countering terrorism in the country.
This was the first and last board meeting held under the original Act. In July 2019, parliament amended it through an ordinance, which it later passed in March 2020. The amendment made the interior minister the board chairman and the national coordinator its secretary. Several references to the “prime minister” in the Act were also replaced, shifting Nacta’s reporting line to the interior ministry. The 2019-2020 amendments thus downgraded Nacta from a prime minister-led federal-provincial body to one under the interior minister. Interestingly, one of the few board meetings held since then, and chaired by Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi, approved the establishment of Niftac. Just before Niftac was introduced, Nacta inducted around 130 permanent officers. Since Niftac’s establishment, most have struggled to find a role.
Niftac was described as a national platform connecting more than 50 federal and provincial departments and agencies — supported by provincial fusion centres — to improve intelligence coordination, speed up threat assessment, and strengthen information-sharing across institutional boundaries. That was Nacta’s purpose.
A military or intelligence institution can possess information that a civilian authority cannot access. It can conduct operations a civilian institution cannot. It can assess threats from a classified perspective. But the state also needs an institution that can sit openly with provincial police, civil administration, prosecutors, courts, parliamentarians, researchers and international partners. It needs an institution whose authority is intelligible within the civilian legal and administrative system.
Against this backdrop, Niftac overshadowed Nacta. Even before Maj Gen Faisal Naseer was appointed national coordinator, Niftac and its officers from the superior security institutions appeared more assertive and powerful than the national coordinator.
In fact, Nacta, the only civilian-led CT body, struggled to find its role and eventually lost that struggle. Now the vision and implementation plan will flow top-down, and space for consultation, policy discourse, and debate will gradually vanish.
This institutional transformation is taking place at a time when Pakistan faces its worst terrorism challenge, one that is growing more complex by the day. The state is trying hard to find a way out of the menace, but these transformations will not solve it. Concentrating power in one set of hands can be challenging because absolute control centralises the burden.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, October 11th, 2026
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