THE world had good reason to watch the US midterm elections with bated breath, because their outcome would not only determine the balance of power in Washington, but also shape the course of major international conflicts — particularly in the Middle East — and establish how much political bandwidth President Donald Trump would retain to pursue his foreign policy during the final two years of his presidency.
The verdict has been considerably harsher than many had anticipated, chiefly because of the fallout of the Iran war. As the election outcome was influenced by an external issue, the implications will accordingly be reflected more on the foreign policy front.
For foreign capitals, the significance of the result lies less in the change of congressional control itself but what it means for Trump’s ability, and willingness, to use American power abroad. A midterm defeat does not automatically diminish presidential authority over foreign affairs and military operations. Trump, therefore, retains considerable discretion over military operations and negotiations, as well as executive powers over sanctions and trade.
What he has actually lost is political room to manoeuvre as Democrats in the Congress can now investigate, obstruct funding and impose greater scrutiny on his decisions.
Compounding that would be the fact that some key Republicans, mindful of their own electoral prospects in 2028, may become less willing to defend his policies that come with a political cost.
The resulting situation could constrain the president over time, but it would not necessarily make him more cautious in the immediate term.
Iran
Iran will be the immediate test of how Trump responds to the Republican rout. The electoral setback has created a paradox for the president because while the war is the key reason for the debacle, many think he may still be tempted to intensify military pressure in the hope of securing a decisive outcome before the political space for doing so narrows further.
Christopher Clary, a non-resident fellow at Stimson Center, points out that “the Constitution grants the president enormous latitude on the use of force and the president can escalate despite the new Democratic Congress.”
But escalation carries the risk of aggravating the original problem. Iranian retaliation in that case could deepen the economic pressures and make the war an even greater political liability. The indications from Tehran further suggest that resumption of full-scale hostilities could also lead to widening of the conflict.
Importantly, Trump has a crucial window of two months before the new Congress takes office. But after the transition, political calculations will change with Democrats making the Iran war a major focus of oversight.
They could also pursue War Powers resolutions, requiring congressional authorisation for continued hostilities, in addition to attaching conditions or restrictions to defence appropriations.
Mr Clary warned that “the lame duck period before the new Congress is sworn in will be an especially dangerous time.”
He emphasised that while there are “no real binding constraints on Trump”, the Democrats can “use their budgetary authority to deny new funds to sustain the operation”.
The control of spending will give Democrats additional leverage, although it will not automatically enable them to terminate military operations because Trump retains veto power, which he has hinted that he will use, and Democrats don’t command the two-thirds majority needed to override it. Moreover, Democrats will not either want to be seen as curtailing support for American forces.
Quincy Institute Vice President Trita Parsi recalled that “the Vietnam war ended because Congress stopped funding it”, adding, “Democrats can do this to Trump’s illegal Iran war as well. If they don’t, they will become complicit”.
Sustaining an open ended campaign will, in any case, become politically more difficult and even Republicans, conscious of the electoral cost of the Iran war, may also become increasingly reluctant to support additional funding without a clearer strategy and exit plan.
If things do come to that point sometime next year, Trump can then become inclined towards a combination of military pressure and diplomacy by extracting concessions from Tehran through the threat of further strikes while pursuing an agreement, which he can present as an achievement and a resolution of the conflict.
Pakistan
For Pakistan, the Democrat victory presents a more gradual test. The turnaround in relations under Trump depended heavily on the president and his inner circle, rather than an actual shift in the relationship.
Islamabad had moved quickly to cultivate ties with the new administration after Trump returned to office — extraditing the accused in Abbey Gate Kabul bombing; praising the president’s intervention in the May 2025 conflict with India; nominating him for the Nobel Peace prize; and, joining his Board of Peace for Gaza.
The unprecedented White House working lunch with Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir in June 2025 — sans PM Shehbaz Sharif — further underscored the importance of the military channel. Critical minerals and cryptocurrency also became prominent areas of engagement, alongside proposals involving Trump family-backed World Liberty Financial, the Roosevelt Hotel and drone manufacturing.
A Democratic Congress is unlikely to undo the relationship, but it could subject some of these dealings to greater scrutiny. Questions may be raised about foreign links of the Trump family’s commercial interests, the cooperation with Powerus and Pakistan’s governance and transparency.
Mentioning these aspects, Michael Kugelman of the Atlantic Council noted that “scrutiny of Trump and his family’s business dealings will increase… If so, that could spell bad news for Pakistan.”
Erik Sperling, executive director of Just Foreign Policy, recalled earlier congressional letters and legislation initiated by Democrats, raising concerns about the situation in Pakistan, and expected that with Democrats now controlling the House, these measures will have a clear path to floor votes.
Islamabad’s earlier effort to secure a $10bn US Treasury financial backstop has found little enthusiasm, with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasising self-reliance and IMF reforms. A Democratic controlled Congress would make congressional support for a large financial arrangement even more difficult.
There will, nevertheless, be areas of bipartisan convergence, particularly counterterrorism, regional stability, critical minerals and Pakistan’s diplomatic role in the Iran conflict. The challenge for Islamabad will be to translate the access secured under Trump into a relationship with a wider institutional base, including engagement with Democrats and a stronger case for durable economic cooperation.
Other arenas
A Democratic Congress could help preserve military and economic support for Ukraine and scrutinise arms transfers to Israel, without forcing Trump to abandon his preference for a negotiated settlement with Moscow or bringing about an abrupt change in US policy towards Israel.
Adam Weinstein, deputy Middle East director at the Quincy Institute, said: “Uncritical support for Israel, and more importantly, close ties to AIPAC, have become serious political liabilities in the US. These results reflect that shift.”
Noted commentator Max Blumenthal said that while “the ‘special relationship’ with Israel was once a matter of bipartisan unity among party elites, it’s become a polarising wedge issue and a poison pill for any president”.
He pointed out that Trump, while realising the gravity of the situation, had announced that he will cut $4 billion in annual aid to Israel, in a last-ditch bid to salvage the Republican situation ahead of the polls.
Saudi Arabia, too, may face closer scrutiny over nuclear cooperation and security commitments, while the UAE and Egypt could encounter greater congressional attention to human rights and military assistance.
On China, strategic competition is likely to remain bipartisan, although Democrats may place greater emphasis on alliances and supply chain resilience. They may also seek to reclaim some congressional oversight over tariffs and trade.
Washington-based analyst Shuja Nawaz thinks “Cuba may be the easiest target for President Trump. He might also try his hand at summitry with Putin and Xi but it is unlikely to gain much. They have consistently outplayed him”.
After facing increased opposition to his domestic agenda, Trump may now turn increasingly to foreign policy, trade and military decisions, where his executive authority is wider, but international partners will have to consider whether commitments made by this administration can survive a change of political direction in Washington, come 2028.
Published in Dawn, November 5th, 2026
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